This paper investigates whether the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure mitigates asymmetric information and adverse selection in the Euronext Paris stock exchange. We apply a disclosure index as a proxy for the extent of voluntary disclosure and use different spread measures to estimate both asymmetric information and adverse selection. Our findings show a negative relationship between the disclosure index and asymmetric information and adverse selection proxies. An analysis of subindexes provides additional mixed results. Several asymmetric information measures are negatively related to the volume of financial, non-financial and voluntary governance information in corporate annual reports. Nevertheless, the effect of strategic information volume is statistically significant only for effective bid-ask spreads. On the whole, these results are consistent with the view that high corporate voluntary disclosure is associated with narrow spreads and low adverse selection costs.
Introduction
Prior research shows that annual reports are the main source of mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosure (e.g., Wiseman, 1982; Rockness, 1985; Neu et al., 1998) . Corporate stakeholders use these reports as an important summary of a firm's performance indicators (Lang and Lundholm, 1996) . Among studies that examine disclosure in annual reports, Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Holland (1998) show a positive correlation between disclosure in this basic document and other forms of disclosure. Recently, Zarb (2007) suggested that the amount of information contained in corporate annual reports is the best evidence of the level of firm disclosure.
Recent years have seen an increase in the quantity and quality of corporate annual report content. Information in this basic document has become more abundant and varied. In addition to the mandatory financial information, managers provide governance, strategic, environmental, and social information in annual reports. However, despite the variety of the information, we have observed a dramatic increase in information asymmetries in stock exchange markets and deterioration in environmental transparency. This leads many of us to ask about the relevance of corporate disclosure practices. In our paper, we attempt to ascertain how managers' voluntary disclosure decisions, in particular the volume of voluntary information in annual reports, influence the degree of information asymmetry in stock exchange markets.
Several studies demonstrate that corporate disclosure decisions, as proxied by earnings quality (e.g., Richardson, 2000; Ascioglu et al., 2012; Bhattacharya et al., 2012), disclosure policy (e.g., Heflin et al., 2005; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007) or voluntary earnings announcements (e.g., Lakhal, 2008) affect information asymmetry and uncertainty in stock exchange markets. However, much less attention has been paid to the extent of the voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports. Our paper extends prior studies and interest to the impact of this form of voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry in the French exchange market. Our paper differs from prior studies in many aspects. Firstly, it aims to verify whether the volume of diversified voluntary information provided by managers in annual reports improves market information symmetry. Secondly, it deepens the analysis of the sub-categories of voluntary information disclosed in annual reports. In addition, it combines classical finance and behavioral finance in order to analyze empirically a major problem in stock exchange markets: the adverse selection problem. We use panel data from 159 commercial and manufacturing firms operating in the French exchange market from 2004 to 2009. The choice of France as the framework of our study was for several reasons. Firstly, a weakness in investor protection rules and the ineffectiveness of the legal system are characteristics of the French judicial environment (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; Coffee, 2001 ; Piot and Janin, 2007) . In this context, disclosure decisions are expected to be important in reducing information asymmetry between market participants. Secondly, French managers have increasingly opted for voluntary disclosure in order to report their firms' performances to the market (e.g., Lakhal, 2008) . France has witnessed significant development in corporate governance rules, particularly disclosure standards and firm transparency. Despite this increasing tendency, information asymmetry and the illiquidity problem this generates persist in France. Finally, the French market has significant weight in the European market. Therefore, the choice of France as the framework in which to investigate the effects of voluntary disclosure is another distinguishing feature of our study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background. Section 3 outlines the sample, describes the data and defines the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 reports and discusses the main empirical findings. Section 6 offers some conclusions.
Theoritical background
Information asymmetry, based on Akerlof's (1970) interpretation, occurs when some investors hold private information about a firm's value. This generates an adverse selection problem in the stock exchange market if these better informed investors use this private information in trading. Several drawbacks are likely to be caused by information asymmetry, such as an increased cost of capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997) , illiquidity problems (e.g., Hong and Huang, 2005; Easley, 2010) , increased dispersions and errors in analysts' forecasts (e.g., Zhang, 2010 ) and much more difficult access to market capital (e.g., Frost et al., 2008) .
Theoretical literature (e.g., Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) predicts that a good disclosure policy may mitigate the information asymmetry problem, as it is associated with relatively less well-informed trading. A decrease in information asymmetry can be characterized as narrower bid-ask spreads (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . Empirical evidence in Welker (1995), Healy et al. (1999) and Heflin et al. (2005) support this argument. They provide evidence that a better disclosure policy not only reduces information asymmetry and uncertainty, but also prevents stock exchange market failure since it improves market liquidity. Welker (1995) demonstrates a negative relation between disclosure quality and bid-ask spreads. His sample mainly includes large firms and focuses on disclosure activities compiled by the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) between 1983 and 1990. In the same market, Healy et al. (1999) examine the association between disclosure quality as proxied by AIMR scores and information asymmetry over the period [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Similar to Welker (1995) , they show that bid-ask spreads are negatively related to corporate disclosure quality. The same view is supported by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) , who adopt a time series approach to examine the association between disclosure quality and information asymmetry. The authors analyze changes in three proxies for information asymmetry (bid-ask spreads, trading volume and price volatility) for a sample of German firms that moved from German Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to International Accounting Standards (IAS) or US GAAP. The authors provide evidence that the improvement in disclosure standards for the firms that switched is associated with decreased information asymmetry among investors.
Similar to Welker (1995) 2012) utilize effective spread and the price impact of a trade as proxies for information asymmetry. The three studies provide evidence that the level of information asymmetry is significantly greater for firms with poor earnings quality. This view is also supported by Bhattacharya et al. (2007) , who conclude that poor earnings quality results in higher adverse selection risk and increased trading costs. According to these authors, an increase in information asymmetry is an unambiguous consequence of poor earnings quality.
The investor recognition hypothesis (Merton, 1987) suggests that investors are more likely to trade in firms which are well known and/or that they judge favorably. Then, since voluntary disclosure increases a firm's visibility (e.g., Bushee and Miller, 2012) and reduces the level of private information (e.g., Diamand, 1985) , this may encourage uninformed traders to invest in firms that have higher voluntary information disclosure levels. In light of the above literature review, we anticipated that firms with good disclosure quality, inter alia, and a greater extent of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports have narrower bid-ask spreads and a lower adverse selection component.
Data

Sample selection and data sources
Our initial sample consisted of all French listed firms belonging to the French SBF 250 Index between 2004 and 2009. As in prior studies, we excluded regulated utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), since they are subject to specific legal and regulatory disclosure requirements. We also discarded all firms with missing financial data. This reduced our final data to 159 French commercial and manufacturing firms (954 firm-year observations). Financial data related to, for instance, closed stock prices, bid and ask prices, return volatility and trading volume were retrieved from the Datastream database. The annual reports used were found in the Worldscope database and downloaded from the French stock market authority (AMF) website.
Information asymmetry proxies: dependent variables
To test our hypothesis, we computed three measures of information asymmetry: effective bid-ask spread (ESP); quoted bid-ask spread (QSP) and the adverse selection component (ADC).
Bid-ask spread
The relevant literature emphasizes that when information asymmetry between market participants is higher, bid-ask spreads will be wider. Accordingly, we used bid-ask spreads as a proxy for information asymmetry. ESP was calculated as the yearly average of daily effective bid-ask spreads. We followed the studies by Lin et al. (1995) and Heflin et al. (2005) and measured the daily effective spread as twice the absolute value of the difference between a transaction price and the midpoint of the bid and ask prices. This was computed using the following formula:
Bid Ask P ESP (1) Where Ask t (Bid t ) is the best ask (bid) price on day t.
To assess annual average spread, we divided the sum of daily effective spreads by the total number of trading days during the quotation year.
QSP was calculated as the yearly average of daily quoted bid-ask spreads. The daily quoted bid-ask spread was measured using the following formula:
We divided the sum of daily quoted spreads by the total number of trading days during the quotation year in order to obtain the annual average quoted spread.
Adverse selection component
The market microstructure literature (e.g., Stoll, 2000) suggests that a bid-ask spread includes three components: order processing costs, inventory holding costs and adverse selection costs. Information asymmetry or adverse selection costs are reflected in wider bid-ask spreads as market makers expand the spread to recover the expected losses incurred from trading with better-informed traders (e.g., Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Harris, 1988) . We calculated the adverse selection component as a direct measure of information asymmetry costs as bid-ask spread measures also capture fixed and inventory components of trading (e.g., Huang and Stoll, 1994) .
To obtain the adverse selection component (λ), we followed Lin et al.'s (1995) model as developed from Stoll (1989) , Lin (1993) and Huang and Stoll (1994) . Thus, we estimated the following equation under the OLS method:
is defined as the daily bid-ask midpoint of firm i.
is one-half the signed effective spread.
 reflects the quote revision in response to a trade as a fraction of the daily effective spread. It is defined as the daily adverse selection component of the daily effective spread. We calculated the annual average information asymmetry component from daily observations.
Referring to Cheng et al.'s (2006) study, we multiplied each stock's annual average information asymmetry component by the annual average of its effective spread in order to obtain the adverse selection costs induced by informed trading. Thus, our measure of the adverse selection cost of the effective spread was defined as follows:
Voluntary disclosure score
The explanatory variable is the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports measured using selfconstructed "disclosure indexes". We developed a disclosure checklist based on relevant existing studies by Meek information (GOV-VD, 11 items). In line with Cooke (1992), we conducted a content analysis to identify the presence of information in annual reports. The VDSCORE is the total of the scores awarded for each item in the voluntary disclosure checklist. Table 1 presents a checklist of items included in the disclosure scores. We assigned a value of one when a given item is disclosed and zero otherwise. The total score for each sample firm was computed as an unweighted sum of the scores of all the items in the index. is defined as the average share price. We measured the return volatility (STD-DV) using the yearly average of standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns. The yearly average of daily trading number is a proxy for trading volume (TRADVOL). Firm size (TA) is defined as total firm assets.
Regression model
In summary, we modeled information asymmetry as a function of the extent of voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports and other firm operating characteristics, particularly, share price, return volatility, trading volume and firm size. We transformed the financial variables through a logarithmic function to reduce their disparity. The OLS regression model with firm-fixed effects is as follows:
Where i and t are sub-scripts denoting the firm (N = 159) and time (T = 6), respectively; α i is a firmfixed effect; β is an estimation parameter; and μ it is an error term. LNINFASS is equal to the natural log of one of the three proxies for information asymmetry defined below; EVD is equal to the global disclosure index, in the first part of our empirical study, and to one of the four sub-indexes in the second part; LNPRICE is the natural log of a firm's average share price; LNTRADVOL is the natural log of a firm's average trading volume; LNSTD-DV is the natural log of the average standard deviation of stock return; and LNTA is equal to the natural log of total assets. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for our three information asymmetry measures and their explanatory variables. The descriptive statistics show that our sampled firms have an average effective spread equal to 0.0073 and an average quoted bid-ask spread equal to 0.0076. The average information asymmetry component of our sample is equal to 0.0013 and ranges from 0.0381 to 5.5301E-05. The total disclosure index has a mean (median) of 0.4040 (0.4159) and ranges from 0.6461 to 0.0708. Despite several disclosure codes motivating firms to publish further information, we documented diversity in the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports (with a standard deviation equal to 0.1115). The share price of our sample had an average equal to $46.5539, higher than that documented by 
Analysis and results
Descriptive statistics
Pearson correlation matrix
In this part of our empirical study, we test the possible presence of a multicollinearity problem. This primary analysis is in order to ensure the statistical robustness of our regression model Indeed, the existence of a high correlation between the explanatory variables in the studied model could influence the estimators. The matrix of Pearson correlations presented in Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between our explanatory variables. 1.0000 -0.3147 TA 1.0000 ESP= the effective bid-ask spread; QSP= the quoted bid-ask spread; ADC= adverse selection component; ARVD=disclosure score; STGVD, NFNVD, FNVD and GOVD= disclosures sub-indexes proxy for the volume of strategic, non-financial, financial and governance voluntary information, respectively; PRICE= the average share price; TRADVOL= the average trading volume; STD-DV=the return volatility; TA= the total firm assets.
According to Kervin (1992) , a multicollinearity problem exists when the correlation coefficient between two explanatory variables reaches a critical value of 0.7. Kennedy (1985) , among others, extends this value to 0.8. From Table 3 , it can be seen that the correlation coefficients for our explanatory variables 1 are much lower than the threshold of 0.8. Accordingly, multicollinearity does not present a problem in our study. Table 4 presents the regression results of the information asymmetry proxies in the global disclosure index, using stock price, return volatility, trading volume and firm size as control variables. LNINFASS= one of the three information asymmetry proxies; LNESP= the natural log of the effective bid-ask spread; LNQSP= the natural log of the quoted bid-ask spread; LNADC= the natural log of adverse selection component; ARVD= global disclosure index; LNPRICE= the natural log of the average share price ; LNTRADVOL= the natural log of the average trading volume; LNSTD.DV=the natural log of the average standard deviation of the stock return; LNTA= the natural log of the total firm assets.
Empirical results for the regression analysis
The results of the regression model confirm our predictions. The ARVD coefficients are negative and statistically significant for three information asymmetry proxies. The extent of the voluntary disclosure in annual reports reduces the quoted bid-ask spreads, particularly the adverse selection component. These findings are consistent with prior studies, such as those by Lang and Lundholm (1993) , Welker (1995) , Healy et al. (1999) , Heflin et al. (2005) and Lakhal (2008) . These other studies show evidence that high voluntary disclosure plays a significant role in reducing information asymmetry between investors and mitigating adverse selection problems. Our results confirm the theoretical suggestions of Diamond (1985) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) that disclosing further voluntary information to the market reduces the level of private information about outstanding share quality and the incentive of investors to acquire private information, thus decreasing adverse selection costs and improving information symmetry between market participants.
To explain our results we also refer to Bushee and Miller (2012) , in that voluntary disclosure increases firm visibility, and Merton's (1987) finding that investors are more likely to invest in firms about which they know more. The evidence suggests that firms that disclose further information in their annual reports can encourage investor confidence and uninformed traders are more likely to invest in their shares. Information asymmetry, where there is greater voluntary disclosure, seems to be less troublesome for shareholders. Tables 5, 6 , 7 and 8 present the regression results of the three information asymmetry proxies for the disclosure sub-indexes for strategic, financial, nonfinancial and governance information and the control variables as previously defined. LNINFASS= one of the three information asymmetry proxies; LNESP= the natural log of the effective bid-ask spread; LNQSP= the natural log of the quoted bid-ask spread; LNADC= the natural log of adverse selection component; STGVD = disclosure sub-index proxy for the volume of strategic voluntary information; LNPRICE= the natural log of the average share price; LNTRADVOL= the natural log of the average trading volume; LNSTD.DV=the natural log of the average standard deviation of the stock return; LNTA= the natural log of the total firm assets. 2.0793 LNINFASS= one of the three information asymmetry proxies; LNESP= the natural log of the effective bid-ask spread; LNQSP= the natural log of the quoted bid-ask spread; LNADC= the natural log of adverse selection component; FNVD =disclosure sub-index proxy for the volume of financial voluntary information; LNPRICE= the natural log of the average share price; LNTRADVOL= the natural log of the average trading volume; LNSTD.DV=the natural log of the average standard deviation of the stock return; LNTA= the natural log of the total firm assets. LNINFASS= one of the three information asymmetry proxies; LNESP= the natural log of the effective bid-ask spread; LNQSP= the natural log of the quoted bid-ask spread; LNADC= the natural log of adverse selection component; NFNVD =disclosure sub-index proxy for the volume of financial voluntary information ; LNPRICE= the natural log of the average share price; LNTRADVOL= the natural log of the average trading volume; LNSTD.DV=the natural log of the average standard deviation of the stock return; LNTA= the natural log of the total firm assets. 2.0819 LNINFASS= one of the three information asymmetry proxies; LNESP= the natural log of the effective bid-ask spread; LNQSP= the natural log of the quoted bid-ask spread; LNADC= the natural log of adverse selection component; GOVD =disclosure sub-index proxy for the volume of governance voluntary information ; LNPRICE= the natural log of the average share price; LNTRADVOL= the natural log of the average trading volume; LNSTD.DV=the natural log of the average standard deviation of the stock return; LNTA= the natural log of the total firm assets. Table 5 provides the results of the relationship between the extent of strategic disclosure and the three information asymmetry proxies. The coefficient for the strategic disclosure sub-index is negative, but statistically significant only for the ESP. The findings show that the three information asymmetry measures (QSP, ESP and ADC) are significantly and negatively associated with the volume of voluntary financial, non-financial and governance information provided by managers in annual reports. The results given in Table  6 suggest that additional financial information is useful for investors to appreciate better firm performance, thus confirming prior studies (e.g., Hossain and Marks, 2005; Zarb, 2007) and emphasizing the significance of additional financial information for firm assessment. In addition, our results shown in Table 7 demonstrate that investors include non-financial information, inter alia, about firms' human capital, social responsibilities and environmental policies in their evaluation. This confirms the added value of non-financial information and the benefits of encouraging managers to provide further non-financial information. Table 8 shows that the extent of voluntary governance disclosure reduces information asymmetry and mitigates the adverse selection problem. These findings are coherent with prior studies such as that by Cormier et al. (2010) .
Firm size and the average standard deviation are positively and significantly related to the three information asymmetry measures. These findings suggest that large firms with a more volatile stock return are more exposed to the risk of adverse selection and, therefore, subject to more information asymmetry problems. The results linked to volatility are consistent with previous literature (e.g., Welker, 1995; Heflin et al., 2005) . However, the results linked to firm size contrast with the findings of prior studies. In general, large firms have a complex managerial structure and various stakeholders, which imply more agency problems (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and reinforce conflicts between insiders and outsiders, thus accentuating information asymmetry for these firms.
The coefficients of share price were significantly negative for all our regressions, suggesting that lowerpriced shares have a greater spread and adverse selection component and, consequently, a lower degree of information asymmetry. Results for trading volume showed a negative and significant relationship between yearly average trading volume and the three proxies of information asymmetry. The results suggest that a lower trading volume demonstrates a higher degree of information asymmetry.
Robustness tests
We also needed to check the robustness of our results. For this reason, we estimated our model using simultaneous equations. The objective of this test was to check, firstly, whether the sign and the significance of our estimator changed with the estimation method; secondly, to examine the existence of simultaneity between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry proxies as provided in prior studies (e.g., Welker, 1995) . Table 9 presents the results of our robustness tests using simultaneous equations models. LNESP= the natural log of the effective bid-ask spread; LNQSP= the natural log of the quoted bid-ask spread; LNADC= the natural log of adverse selection component; ARVD = global disclosure index; LNPRICE= the natural log of the average share price; LNTRADVOL= the natural log of the average trading volume; LNSTDDV=the natural log of the average standard deviation of the stock return; LNTA= the natural log of the total firm assets; LNMVE=the natural log of market value of equity at the fiscal year end; LNDEBT=the natural log of the firm leverage rate; LNROE= the natural log of the return of equity; LNANF= the natural log (1+number of financial analysts following the firm share); Industry= is binary variable equal to 1, when the firm's industry is Technology otherwise 0.
The findings show that the estimators of the determinants of both price spreads keep the same sign and statistical significance, thus confirming the robustness of our results. The findings also suggest that causality can run in both directions.
Conclusion
The current paper aims to shed some light on the role of voluntary disclosure in market information asymmetry. In particular, we intended to verify whether the extent of voluntary information in annual reports plays a significant role in reducing the level of information asymmetry between investors and in attenuating the adverse selection problem. Our empirical study used panel data for 159 French commercial and manufacturing firms listed in the SBF 250 Index from 2004 to 2009 (954 firm-year observations).
The relevant literature (e.g., Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Harris, 1988) emphasizes that greater information asymmetry is reflected in wider bid-ask spreads to recover the expected losses incurred from trading with betterinformed traders. Accordingly, we used effective and quoted bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component of the effective spread as proxies for information asymmetry in the French market. We considered our information asymmetry proxies as the extent of voluntary disclosure measured using selfconstructed "disclosure indexes" developed under four general categories: strategic, financial, non-financial and governance information. We controlled for firm particularities including other determinants of bid-ask spreads. Referring to prior studies (e.g., Hanley et al. The results show that the three information asymmetry proxies used -effective and quoted bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component -are negatively and significantly associated with the global disclosure index. The results highlight the benefit of voluntary disclosure in annual reports, as a higher volume of voluntary information in this document is associated with a lower level of information asymmetry in the financial market.
The study of sub-indexes effects provided mixed results. The effective and quoted bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component are negatively related to the volume of voluntary financial, non-financial and governance information disclosed in annual reports. These findings provide evidence that additional information about the financial situation, corporate governance practices, and corporate social and environmental policies are useful for investors in the stock exchange market. They are consistent with prior studies that suggest the significance of governance (e.g., Cormier et al., 2010 ) and non-financial (e.g., Jorion and Talmor, 2001 ) information in the capital market. Hence, the main message of our study is that an information market that is more opaque than transparent and characterized by fewer voluntary disclosures aggravates information asymmetry problems and increases adverse selection costs.
